The paper takes an asset pricing perspective to investigate the equity market comovement and contagion at the sector level during the period 1990-2004 across the regions of Europe, Asia and Latin America. It examines whether unexpected shocks from a particular market, or group of markets, are propagated to the sectors in other countries. The results confirm the sector heterogeneity of contagion. This implies that there are sectors which can still provide a channel for achieving the benefits of international diversification during crises despite the prevailing contagion at the market level. In addition, the results lend support to the importance of financial links in the propagation of contagion.
Introduction
Researchers have shown a long time interest in the study of financial market comovement.
Various studies have found that market comovement is currently higher. 1 This increased comovement can be attributed to the increasing market integration in relation to the close economic and financial links. However, market integration may not fully explain this comovement, and contagion may, in part, contribute to the process. In the last decade or so, financial markets were hit by a series of crises: the 1992 ERM attacks, the 1994 Mexican peso collapse, the 1997 East Asian crisis, the 1998
Russian collapse, the 1998 LTCM crisis, the 1999 Brazilian devaluation and the 2000 technological crisis. A striking feature during those crises is that markets tend to move more closely together compared to tranquil times. Such strong comovement is frequently referred to as contagion.
Evaluating if contagion occurs and understanding its origin is important for policy makers and fund managers aiming to diversify risks. If contagion prevails in times of crises, the benefits of international diversification will be hampered when they are mostly needed.
Many papers have studied the contagion effect on the equity markets (e.g. King and Wadhwani, 1990; Forbes and Rigobon, 2001, 2002; and Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 2005) . All of them focus on the empirical evidence at the market level and examine whether contagion exists across markets. The question they try to answer is whether idiosyncratic shocks from one particular market or group of markets are transmitted to the other markets during financial crises. In this paper, we take a different perspective and explore the equity market contagion at the disaggregated sector level, an issue which has not yet been examined in the literature. The question we endeavour to answer is whether unexpected shocks from a particular market, or group of markets, are propagated to the sectors in other countries.
Studying the contagion effect at sector level is important for several reasons. First, studying the contagion at the market level may mask the heterogeneous performances of various sectors.
Sector contagion can be asymmetric, in the sense that some sectors are more severely affected by external shocks than other sectors within a market. Forbes (2002) shows that trade linkages are an important determinant of a country's vulnerability to crises that originate from elsewhere in the world.
If this is so, sectors with extensive international trade (e.g. traded goods sectors) would tend to be more prone to external shocks than sectors with less international trade (e.g. non-traded goods sectors).
Some sectors (e.g. Banking) may even constitute a major channel in transmitting the shocks across markets during crises (see e.g. Tai, 2004; and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) . From the point view of portfolio management, the sector heterogeneity of contagion implies that there are sectors which can still provide a channel for achieving the benefits of international diversification during crises despite the prevailing contagion at the market level. Second, there is evidence showing that in recent years the global industry factors are becoming more important than the country specific factors in driving the variation of international equity returns (e.g. Baca et al., 2000; Cavaglia et al., 2000; and Phylaktis and Xia, 2006a) . 2 Industries have overcome the cross-border restrictions and become increasingly correlated worldwide, which increases the likelihood of industries' role in propagating global shocks and providing a channel for transmitting the contagion effect. Third, the industrial composition varies across global markets. Large, mature markets (e.g. US and UK) are comprised of more diversified industries whereas small, less mature markets (e.g. Switzerland) are usually concentrated on a few industries. It is thus interesting to know whether markets with similar industrial structures will comove more closely with each other and be more prone to contagion during crises compared to markets with different industrial structures.
The importance of industry/sector analysis is also highlighted in other studies. Campbell et al. (2001) decompose the firms' returns into market, industry and firm specific components to study the volatility at the market, industry and firm levels. They have found that all three volatility measures increase substantially in economic downturns and tend to lead recessions. The volatility measures, particularly the industry-level volatility, help to forecast economic activity and reduce the significance of other commonly used forecasting variables, such as market returns and lagged GDP growth rates. Griffin and Stulz (2001) examine the importance of exchange rate movement and industry competition for equity returns and find that common shocks to industries across countries are more important than competition shocks due to changes in exchange rates. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Rouwenhorst (1998) show that industry momentum strategies are profitable and suggest the existence of time-varying industry risk premium.
The literature on contagion has shown no consensus on the exact definition of contagion. In this paper, we define contagion as excess correlation -that is, correlation over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals. 3 Our paper takes an asset pricing perspective and contagion is defined by the correlation of the model residuals. Our asset pricing model follows the methodology of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) and examines two sources of risk: one from the US equity market (proxy for the world market) and the other from the regional market. This structure nests a world asset pricing model (CAPM) with the US equity return as the benchmark and a regional CAPM with a regional portfolio as the benchmark. We test the asset pricing specifications by adding local factors. Essentially the test of integration or segmentation constitutes a critical step in our analysis. If a sector is globally integrated for most of the sample period but suddenly experiences a strong integration at the regional level during a regional crisis, our test will reject the null hypothesis of no contagion. Conversely, if the sector is initially integrated at the regional level, an increase of regional integration during the regional crisis may not indicate a contagion; rather it is simply a consequence of increased interdependence.
Therefore, our main contribution to the literature is the examination of contagion effect at the sector level. As it has been argued above sector level contagion is an important issue, which has not yet been examined. Our sectoral analysis will also allow us to explore the importance of financial links in the propagation of crises, an issue widely discussed in the literature. We focus on the sectors of small equity markets across three regions: Europe, Asia and Latin America. At the same time, our model tests whether the sectors are more integrated at the global or regional level, thus nesting the empirical work on equity market integration at the industry level, a subject covered in papers such as Carrieri et al. (2004) , Berben and Jansen (2005) and Kaltenhauser (2002 Kaltenhauser ( , 2003 . However, the novelty of our analysis in this area is our focus on the sector returns in 29 smaller markets in Europe, 3 The detailed definitions of contagion are shown on the World Bank's website:
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion Asia and Latin America, whereas the previous papers mainly concentrate on sectors either in the euro zone, or in a few major markets such as the US, UK, Japan, or G-7 countries. This constitutes our paper's second major contribution to the literature.
The remaining of our paper is organized as follows: after reviewing the relevant literature in Section 2, we describe our estimation and modelling framework in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data and the empirical results, while the final section summarizes and concludes this paper.
Related Literature
As mentioned above, our paper draws from two strands of literature: equity market contagion and equity market integration.
Equity market contagion
The primary focus of our paper is to examine the contagion effect at sector level in equity markets and test whether contagion exists in sectors during the periods of financial crises such as the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis in 1997. The previous literature focuses on the crossmarket evidence. The early studies make use of correlation analysis. The central idea is to assess whether the correlation coefficient between two equity markets changes across tranquil and volatile periods. If the correlation increases significantly, it suggests that the transmission between the two markets amplifies after the shock and thus contagion occurs. Papers following this methodology examine the contagion immediately after the US equity market crash of 1987. The seminal reference is King and Wadhwani (1990) , which uses hourly equity market data for the period September 1987
to November 1987 and finds that cross-market correlations between the US, UK and Japan increased significantly after the US crash. Bertero and Mayer (1990) extend this analysis to a sample of 23 industrialized and developing countries and find also that the correlation coefficients increased appreciably following the equity market crash in the US. Lee and Kim (1993) find further evidence of contagion when applying the same approach to twelve major markets: the average weekly cross-market correlations went from 0.23 before the 1987 crash up to 0.39 afterwards. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) focus on emerging markets and find that the correlations in equity prices and Brady bonds between Asian and Latin American emerging markets increased significantly during the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) present the most thorough analysis using this framework and test for contagion in equity indices, currency prices, interest rates and sovereign spreads in emerging markets during the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. They document a surge of cross-market correlations during the crisis for many of the countries.
However, later studies have recognized that focusing on correlations can be misleading. For example, Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002) show that looking at unadjusted correlation coefficients is not appropriate, as the calculated correlation coefficient is an increasing function of the variance of the underlying asset return, so that when coefficients between a tranquil period and a crisis period are compared, the coefficient in the crisis period is biased upwards as volatility rises substantially. After correcting for this bias, they find no contagion during the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1994 Mexican peso collapse, and the 1987 US equity market crash. Instead, a high level of market co-movement is found during these crises periods, which reflects a continuation of strong cross-market linkages present globally. Their conclusion is "there is no contagion, only interdependence". On the other hand, a contrary argument is developed in Corsetti et al. (2005) , who suggest that the results of Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002) are highly dependent on their specification of idiosyncratic shocks. When these shocks are accounted for, contagion was present during the Asian crisis. Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) avoid the above correlation analysis and develop a two-factor (global and regional) asset pricing model to examine the equity market contagion in the regions of Europe, South-East Asia and Latin America during both the Mexican and Asian crises of the 1990s.
By defining contagion as correlation among the model residuals after controlling for the local and foreign shocks, the authors show that there is no evidence of additional contagion caused by the Mexican crisis. However, economically meaningful increases in the residual correlation are found, especially in Asia, during the Asian crisis, a result confirmed by Dungey, Fry and Martin (2003) and others who have studied the contagion in Asian equity markets.
Industry level integration
Equity market integration has been extensively studied, while integration at the industry level has been of recent interest (see e.g. Carrieri et al., 2004; Barben and Jansen, 2005; and Kaltenhauser, 2002, 2003 
Framework of Analysis

The models
We examine the sector returns using the two-factor asset pricing model developed in Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) , where the two factors are defined as the US market (proxy for the global source of risk) and a particular regional market (proxy for the regional source of risk). We also allow for local factors to be priced. Our model has the following specification: 
where
is the weekly excess return of sector i in country j. (1) by one month at a time. We use this method to study the time-varying integration of our sectors. 4 The US and regional market models are the special cases of (1) 
where the latter comprises a set of world information variables, including a constant, the world market dividend yield, the spread between the 90-day Eurodollar rate and the 3-month Treasury-bill yield, the difference between the US 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 3-month bill yield, the change in the 90-day Treasury bill yield, and the US money supply (M3). These variables are often used in the literature to capture the movement of international equity market returns. For the regional market model, , which includes a constant and the regional market dividend yield. 4 See, e.g. Fratzscher (2002) and Kaltenhauser (2002 Kaltenhauser ( , 2003 for a similar approach to time-varying integration.
Apart from examining the beta parameters, we also calculate the variance ratios for each sector i . As shown in (1), the return of sector i is composed of expected (i.e., the expected excess return) and unexpected parts: the expected excess return of sector i ,
µ , is a linear function of some local information variables as well as the expected excess return on the US and regional markets,
Similarly, the unexpected part of the sector return (
ε ) is driven not only by its own idiosyncratic shocks, but also by the shocks from the US and regional markets, 
To complete the model, we assume that the idiosyncratic shocks from the US, region and the sector i are orthogonal with each other, and therefore the conditional variance of sector i is in the following form:
Equation (6) 
(8)
Tests of integration and contagion at sector level
In examination of the two-factor model of (1)- (3), we assume first that the conditional betas are time-invariant to obtain a benchmark case, and then relax this assumption and allow the betas to change over time. The model (1)- (3) The model (1)- (3) with time-variant betas is examined via the rolling estimation method with one-year regression window. We use this method to study the time-varying integration at sector level. For each sector i , three correlations are considered: with the global shocks from the US market, with the regional shocks from a geographic region, and with intra-sector shocks from the equivalent sectors in other countries within a region. Our model is in the following form: , and the intra-sector shocks (i.e. the sum of equivalent sector shocks within a particular region excluding that sector in country j to be considered),
,ˆ, where G denotes a particular region country k belongs to.
The regression of model (9) across time yields the time-varying coefficient, October 1998. In estimation of the above regression, we establish a baseline level of contagion by examining the shock correlations over the full sample period, i.e. whether the coefficients of m and n are zero (overall contagion for the whole sample period), and test for additional contagion during crisis periods by examining the significant increase of shock correlations during a particular crisis period, i.e. whether n is significantly different from zero (contribution of a particular crisis period to contagion).
The sectoral analysis of contagion allows us also to examine the importance of financial links in the propagation of crises. As it has been mentioned the literature on contagion has highlighted two main channels of transmission of disturbances: trade links and financial links. The latter can come about through for example mutual fund portfolio managers selling assets held in the portfolio in other emerging markets other than the country of the original disturbance in anticipation of future redemptions (see e.g. ; or through bank lenders in financial centres needing to rebalance the overall risk of their asset portfolio due to a crisis in an emerging market leading to a marked reversal in commercial bank lending across markets where the bank has exposure (see e.g. Reinhart, 2000, 2001) . Thus, a test of the hypothesis that 0 n ≠ with respect to t , us e for the financial sector (TOTFL) relates to whether the shock was transmitted through the financial sector of the two countries. 
Model estimation and specification test
Sector returns, together with the US and regional market returns, can be treated as a joint multivariate likelihood function. We estimate this joint function in three stages. In the first stage, the model for the US market is estimated, and then based on the US estimates, we examine the regional market model. In the final stage, a univariate model in (1)- (3) is estimated sector by sector, conditioning on the US and the regional market estimates.
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By using the generalized method of moments, we conduct a series of specification tests on the estimated standardized idiosyncratic shocks,
for sector i (including the US and regional markets). Under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified,
Equation (11b) and (11d) are a sequence of the correct specification for the conditional mean and variance, and we test these two conditions by Ljung-Box Q-statistics. The unconditional moments in the other four constraints are jointly tested by a 2 χ statistics with four degrees of freedom.
Empirical Results
Data
The empirical analysis is conducted on the sector returns for a set of 29 countries that are grouped into three geographical regions -Europe, Asia and Latin America. All the sector indices as well as the US and regional market indices are compiled by and extracted from Datastream
International. We follow the broad distinction of ten economic sectors according to the Financial The conditional betas with respect to the US market are significant for all three regions, with
US and regional models
Europe being the highest (0.593), followed by Latin America (0.576) and Asia (0.431). In terms of variance ratios, more than 30% of the conditional return variance in Europe can be attributed to the US shocks, whereas the ratios are 15.68% and 12.25% for Latin America and Asia respectively.
Sector level integration
In this sub-section, we estimate GARCH model (1) Generally, our Wald tests reveal that most sectors in the three regions are priced at both regional and global level, with local information having little explanatory power in the return process.
However, one single factor CAPM (special case of our two factor model) is usually rejected, indicating that it is not a good description of the data by itself. Nevertheless, the covariance with one factor benchmark is a significant determinant of expected returns for most sectors.
The conditional betas and variance ratios are our primary focus on the sector level integration analysis. Table 2 reports the average betas and variance ratios with respect to the US and regional markets across the sectors in Europe, Asia and Latin America 9 . In Europe, out of the 10 sectors examined, Information Technology has the highest average betas (0.7105 on the US vs. 0.6368 on the region), whereas Utilities has the lowest betas (0.1255 vs. 0.3635). This is consistent with our prior expectation as Information Technology sector is considered more international in nature, while
Utilities sector is more subject to local country-specific factors. Generally, sectors have a greater beta on the regional market relative to on the US market, suggesting that the European sectors are more responsive to the shocks from their own regional market than to shocks from the US market and thus more integrated at the regional level. The only exception is Information Technology sector, which responds more strongly to the US market innovations as shown by a higher beta with respect to the US than with respect to the region. Not surprisingly, the variance ratios follow the same pattern, and the fraction of the return shock variance explained by the region is larger than that by the US (except for Information Technology).
In Asia, like in Europe, the sector with the highest betas is Information Technology (0.694 on the US vs. 0.5659 on the region) and the sector with lowest betas is Utilities (0.2055 vs. 0.2352).
However, for most sectors, the betas with respect to the US market are larger than the betas with respect to the regional market, suggesting the dominance of the US market in the region. The pattern of the US market dominance is about the same in terms of the variance ratios.
In Latin America, Non-cyclical Services sector tops the rest with the highest betas (0.5834 on the US vs. 0.6885 on the region) and the smallest betas go to the sector of Cyclical Consumer Goods (0.1397 vs. 0.2667). Nevertheless, the sectors in the region display a pattern closer to what we see for the region of Europe, with the betas on the regional market higher than those on the US market.
9 There are only 9 sectors in Latin America and the Information Technology is unclassified in the dataset.
Clearly, the regional integration, relative to the global one, is stronger in Latin America. A similar result can be made from the comparison of the variance ratios.
Summarizing the above, we find that the performance of sectors does vary across regions:
while sectors are dominated by the regional market and thus more strongly integrated at the regional level in Europe and Latin America, they are more influenced by the US market and thus more integrated at the global level in Asia. One point to notice is the distinct deviation of Information
Technology sector, which is more responsive to the global shocks and this global nature is ubiquitous across different regions.
Our finding of regional dominance in Europe is consistent with the market integration analysis in Fratzscher (2002), where it is shown that the European regional market has gained considerably in importance in world financial markets and has taken over from the US as the 
Time-varying integration
To capture the time-varying nature of sector level integration, we relax the assumption of constant betas and allow them to change over time. Our GARCH model (1)- (3) is re-examined via a one-year window rolling estimation to obtain the time-variant betas. Figure 1 details the inter-temporal movement of sector average betas in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Indeed those betas vary substantially, with several peaks and troughs along the time horizon, but distinct features across regions can be observed. For sectors in Europe, the regional betas dominated the US ones for most of the sample period (except for the Information Technology, which mainly had a higher beta with respect to the US than the one with respect to the region). However, we see some periodic shifts from the regional beta dominance to the US beta dominance and the occurrence of those shifts coincide with the crisis periods such as the Mexican crisis in 1994-1995, the Asian crisis in 1997-1998 and In Latin America, the movement of betas was least volatile out of the three regions. All the sectors display a stronger regional level integration for most of the sample period. There were periodic switches of beta dominance over time and those switches were also related to the financial crisis periods.
In general, sector betas in the three regions had a great deal of variation and the beta dominance was unstable over time. We find that the changes of beta dominance from one to the other usually occurred during crisis periods, a possible indication of contagion effects sustained at the sector level.
Sector level Contagion
As explained before, our framework decomposes the correlations of sector returns into two components: the part the asset pricing model explains and the part the model does not explain. The explained part provides potential insights about sector level integration through the movements in the conditional betas. The unexplained part allows us to examine the correlations of model residuals, which we define as the contagion effects at the sector level.
We examine model (9)- (10) to detect the overall contagion for the whole sample as well as the additional contagion during particular crisis periods, where two crises are considered: the Mexican crisis during 1994-1995 and the Asian crisis during 1997-1998 (see Table 3 ). Panel A in Table 3 reports the estimation for the Mexican crisis. Looking first at the overall contagion through the joint test of 0 = = n m , we reject the null of no contagion against all the country-group benchmarks at the 5% level for the majority of sectors in the three regions. However, the channels and magnitude of contagion vary across regions. On the one hand, in Europe and Asia the overall contagion comes from all three channels, each of which is significant: the global shocks, regional shocks and the shocks of regional equivalent sectors. In Latin America it is mainly transmitted via the global and regional shocks channels but the link with the regional equivalent sector shocks is not as widely spread as that in Europe or Asia. On the other hand, comparing the m coefficients against the three benchmarks within each region, we find that sectors in Europe and Latin America had the greatest correlation with the regional residuals whereas in Asia the correlation with the sum of equivalent sector residuals was the greatest. In other words, the highest magnitude of contagion is driven by regional shocks for sectors in Europe and Latin America, but by the equivalent sector shocks for sectors in Asia.
However, our main interest is the additional correlation during crises, which is captured through the n coefficient. We look first at the Mexican crisis and note that only some sectors display a positive and statistically significant coefficient and those are mainly with respect to the US residuals (see Panel A, Table 3 ). In particular, there are 5 sectors in Europe and Asia and 4 in Latin America.
Clearly the Mexican crisis did cause contagion and this was mainly driven by the global shocks (shocks from the US market).
Looking at the sectors that have been affected one notes that the Financial sector (TOTLF) did not show significant additional correlation in the case of Europe and Asia, but it did in the case of Latin America.
The results for contagion during the Asian crisis are presented in Panel B of Table 3 . 5 (4) sectors in Asia had a positive significant n coefficient with respect to the US (regional), whereas the number of significant n coefficients in Europe and Latin America was negligible. This finding indicates that the Asian crisis worsened contagion for many sectors in Asia but had no effect elsewhere. What is also interesting is that the Financial sector displayed additional correlation with respect to the US residuals.
Overall, our analysis reveals that sector residuals are correlated beyond what is captured in our model, suggesting evidence of contagion. On the one hand, an overall contagion at sector level over our entire sample period is found but varies across regions. In terms of possible channels, contagion across the three regions is transmitted via global and regional shocks. But in Europe and Asia, an additional channel is identified, which is the shocks from equivalent sectors within the region.
This confirms our prior expectation that contagion occurs at the sector level and sectors provide channels in propagating unexpected shocks. In terms of the magnitude of contagion, in Europe and Latin America the most severe contagion comes from the regional shocks, whereas in Asia it is mainly driven by the shocks from equivalent sectors within the region.
On the other hand, our analysis of contagion during crisis periods revealed the following.
First, contagion is transmitted in some sectors and not in others. This explains the mixed results found in studies of contagion at the market level. Secondly, the results also point out that even though contagion might be prevalent at the market level, there are still some sectors which are immune from contagion effect during a crisis. This has implications for international portfolio diversification, which are discussed in the next section.
Thirdly, the type of sectors affected provides insights concerning the transmission channels of In the case of the Asian crisis the scenario is different. Our analysis shows that contagion can only be observed in Asia. In addition, the Financial sector is amongst the sectors, which displayed additional correlation with respect to the US. This confirms once again the financial links through the US for the propagation of the crisis. This result is supported by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001, 02) , who examined shifts in portfolios of Europe , North America and Japanese banks during the Asian crisis. They found that North American Banks shifted their lending among emerging markets from Asia to Latin America and Europe explaining also our findings why the last two regions were not affected. In conclusion, our analysis lends support to the importance of financial links through a financial centre such as the US in propagating a crisis, at least within the region of the initial disturbance.
Conclusions
The last decade or so witnessed a series of financial crises and one common observation during those crises is that financial markets tend to co-move more closely than during the tranquil America have higher betas with respect to the regional market than with respect to the US market, suggesting the stronger integration at the regional level. Conversely, sectors in Asia are more responsive to the US market than to the regional market and thus more integrated at the global level.
Information Technology stands out as a sector, as it is more globally integrated regardless of its geographic location.
Second, the pattern of sector integration changes over time, especially during the crisis periods. Across the three regions, we find many sectors showing a sudden change from regional beta dominance to the US beta dominance or vise versa during crisis times. This beta shift points to the fact that contagion is possibly sustained at the sector level.
Third, we find that the sector residuals are economically and statistically significantly correlated with the US market residuals and regional market residuals as well as with the sum of equivalent sector residuals and such correlations are beyond what our asset pricing model accounts for, indicating evidence of contagion. An overall contagion over our entire sample period is found for the majority of sectors in Europe, Asia and Latin America. However there are differences in the transmission channels and in the magnitude of contagion across regions.
Finally, in examining whether the Mexican and Asian crises provide additional contagion effects, we find that nearly half sectors in the three regions were affected via the global shocks during the Mexican crisis. During the Asian crisis no additional contagion is found in Europe or Latin
America, but a worsened contagion transmitted via the global and regional shocks is found for most sectors in Asia. Looking now at the sectors that have been affected one notes that the Financial sector exhibited additional correlation with respect to the US in Latin America during the Mexican crisis and in Asia during the Asian crisis supporting the importance of financial links through a financial center in propagating a crisis.
In conclusion, our results confirm the sector heterogeneity of contagion and this has implications for portfolio managers aiming to diversify risks. On the one hand, industries/sectors are found to have crossed the national boundaries and become integrated with the rest of the world. This means that domestic risk factors now matter less and non-domestic factors matter more so that diversification across countries may be losing the merit and diversification across industries is preferable. However, the divergence of integration across regions points to the fact that industries/sectors are not as globally correlated as we expect and regional effects still play a role.
Therefore selecting portfolios across regions rather than within regions would be more efficient. On the other hand, international investors and portfolio managers are concerned with diversification in volatile times, especially during the crisis periods when it is most needed. Our evidence shows that some sectors are plagued with contagion during crises, so investors and portfolio managers should avoid choosing individual securities from those contagious sectors. However, our evidence also shows that there are sectors which are immune from the external shocks or contagion during the financial crises. Those sectors can provide a tool to diversify risks during the crisis periods and the benefits of diversification can still be achieved.
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